I. Strategic options and the regulatory framework for digital markets 1
Digital technologies, in particular the Internet, are transforming the world. Indeed, advances in technology have not only drastically changed the way data are collected, processed, stored and used in social relations, but also entailed a new challenge to the European Union (hereinafter, "the EU") in particular its legislators and regulators.
It then comes as no surprise that the European Commission has made of the so-called "Digital Single Market Strategy", launched in May 2015, 2 one of its political priorities. As initially defined by the Commission, the Strategy covers 16 specific measures based on three key pillars.
The aim is, firstly, to improve consumer access to digital goods and services throughout Europe by adopting rules on consumer protection, unjustified geoblocking, 4 copyright and the VAT regime, or by identifying the main competitive concerns in this sector. 5 Secondly, the Strategy aims at creating appropriate conditions for the development of digital networks and innovative services by reviewing the rules on telecommunications and privacy in electronic communications, as well as by combating illegal content.
The focus is, thirdly, on the optimization of the growth potential of the digital economy by promoting the free movement of data, standardization and interoperability, as well as enhancing the digital skills of citizens with a view to boosting employability.
It must be said that the European Commission succeeded in completing the main thrust of its three pillars program in January 2017 and presented 35 legislative proposals and policy initiatives between May 2015 and January 2017.
A "mid-term review" of the Strategy was published in May 2017 in which the Commission identified three broad areas where it considers that more vigorous action is needed at Union level.
More precisely: 
10
-The adoption of a regulation aimed at ending the unjustified geographical blockade from December 2018;
11
-The presentation in April 2018 of a proposal for a regulation on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services.
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As can be seen, this is a broad and profound legislative and regulatory activity in a field of decisive importance for strengthening the competitiveness of the European economy in the context of the global digital economy, designed to enable citizens and businesses in the EU to enjoy a set of opportunities created by digital technology, while respecting the fundamental rights of citizens.
II. The economic importance of the "Big Data" and the challenges and risks to the European economy, privacy and the individual rights of citizens
The value of the European data economy is estimated to be around €739 billion in 2020, with the completion of the Digital Single Market contributing €415 billion to the European economy, involving an additional growth of €250 billion over the current Commission's mandate, thus allowing hundreds of thousands of new jobs to be created.
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The long-term impact on GDP growth of the digital economy reform efforts already undertaken was estimated at more than 1%, with additional reform efforts leading to additional GDP growth of 2.1%, which compares with about 0.27% of GDP of benefits resulting from the current level of cross-border e-commerce. 14 8 See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-3241_pt.htm. 9 Regulation 2017/1128 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on cross-border portability of online content services in the internal market, OJ L 168, 30.6.2017, p. 1-11. 10 Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data and repealing Directive 95/46 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Regulation on Data Protection -RGPD), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1-88 . This regulation is not specifically addressed to the digital sector, but is generally applicable to activities subject to Union law, with the exception of Title V, Chapter 2, of the EU Treaty, relating to the common foreign and security policy. Every second, around the world, through smart phones, computers, unmanned vehicles and other types of equipment, increasingly large amounts of data from multiple sources -commonly called "Big Data" -are being generated.
Finding the right balance between achieving the full potential of the digital economy in terms of innovation and economic growth on the one hand, and protecting the core values of our liberal and democratic societies, on the other hand, has become a pressing issue for the various political actors and, in their field of action, the courts. That is why the transformation of the digital economy creates major challenges for respect for the values on which the EU is founded -including democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law.
Recent developments show that one of the most valuable assets in digital markets -the data -can be used to the detriment of the protection of privacy and family life, which are fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter and Article 16 (2) TFEU, which must be respected both by the institutions and bodies of the Union and by the Member States when they are implementing Union law [Article 51 (1) of the Charter].
Indeed, if access to personal data is made available to third parties without the authorization of the holders, the possibility of accessing large amounts of data opens the door to manipulation of public opinion, which may even affect voters' choices. Suffice it to mention, by way of example, the various media episodes carried out by Facebook. The company has been harshly criticized for the hesitant and belated way that it managed the discovery of suspicious Russian activity on the social network (which may have favoured Donald Trump's election) or that it allowed the Cambridge Analytica company to have access to personal information about millions of people.
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As the Financial Times recently reported on its front page, the personal data of 500 million Starwood customers belonging to the Marriott International group dating back to 2004 may have been hacked! Ensuring that data is properly protected and not misused is essential to accomplishing the full potential of the digital economy.
At the same time, the conditions under which modern markets are organised in the digital age change radically in nature, forcing market and competition regulators to adapt to the new business, transaction and communication models that the digital economy provides for.
III. Application of competition law in digital markets
Competition rules must be applied, in light of the existing regulatory framework, in order to remedy market failures arising from the conduct of undertakings that engage in collusive practices or abuse their dominant position, or which could, through an operation of concentration, significantly impede effective competition in digital markets. Although, as Commissioner Margrethe Verstäger has pointed out on a number of occasions, EU competition rules have the necessary plasticity to adapt to new realities, the speed with which digital markets have evolved and the high degree of technicality that characterizes these markets make the application of these rules in the digital age especially complex.
The Commission's Decisions in Google Shopping, 2017, 16 and Google Android, 2018, 17 are particularly illustrative in this respect: in the first case, the Commission analysed about 1.7 billion surveys to assess how people behave online! These decisions are also impressive by the amount of the fines imposed, which were € 2.45 and € 4.34 billion respectively! Those cases led some to claim the need to dismember, in the near future, the "giants" installed in the digital sector, companies like Google, Amazon or Facebook. The Economist recently published an excellent article entitled "The next capitalist revolution", 18 stressing the need to protect competition in this sector. The reality is that, over a little more than a decade, Facebook has managed to connect 2.2 billion people and has built, through messages, photos and likes, one of the most extensive repositories of personal data available.
Such data are indispensable not only for competition between operators in online markets but also for operators active in other sectors.
One of the issues that the Commission examined before approving Microsoft's acquisition of LinkedIn in 2016 was whether the combination of data from both companies would cause significant barriers to competition for other operators. In this context, the so-called 'Neo-Brandeis School' in the United States has advocated a broad and pluralistic conception of the objectives pursued by competition law that may incorporate concerns that go beyond strictly efficiency considerations, including privacy protection.
Some national competition authorities in the EU are examining the conduct of undertakings relating to the collection and misuse of data on digital markets under an new prism concerning the prohibition of abuse of a dominant position.
In this respect, the German competition authority -the Bundeskartellamt -seems inclined to consider that Facebook is abusing its dominant position on the German social networking market by making use of its network subject to the possibility of collecting data from users generated through the use of other websites and applications such as WhatsApp and Instagram, and to integrate them into one's Facebook account.
In this context, and in view of the less formalist approach in the application of competition law promoted in recent years, as well as the increasingly high fines imposed on undertakings, it is more important than ever to emphasize the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter referred to as "CJEU", "Court of Justice" or simply "the Court") according to which the discretion enjoyed by the Commission in matters involving complex assessments is not tantamount to a "blank check" in favour of the latter.
Thus, if the CJEU is not to substitute itself for the Commission in the analysis of facts and evidence or in defining its political priorities in the field of competition, it is incumbent on it to exercise in depth its powers of review of legality and, where appropriate, to ensure that the principle of effective judicial protection enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (hereinafter "the Charter" or "the European Charter") is respected.
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The Court took an important step towards strengthening judicial control of abuses of a dominant position in its judgment in the Grand Chamber case in Intel of September 2017, 20 where it annulled for the first time a decision of the General Court of the European Union (hereinafter "General Court") concerning the application of Article 102 TFEU.
In that judgment, the Court of Justice, by rejecting the fundamental premise of the Commission's decision and the General Court's ruling according to which it was unnecessary to examine all the relevant circumstances of the case, clarified the case-law initiated by Hoffman-La Roche, of 1979, 21 and sent a decisive message to the European Commission: that it cannot rely on any kind of "facilitation" when it makes use of presumptions of abuse to justify an infringement of Article 102 TFEU.
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It must be acknowledged that such an evolution in the case-law, supported by developments in economic science over the last decades, does not make it easier for the competition regulator or the courts to assess the legality of their acts.
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IV. Protection of personal data and fundamental rights in the digital age
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the Google Spain jurisprudence and the "right to be forgotten"
The GDPR 24 is an important step towards restoring or enhancing public confidence in the benefits of digitisation, in particular by promoting greater citizen control over the data concerning them.
Article 17 of the GDPR establishes and regulates what is known as the "right to erasure" or the "right to be forgotten", 25 a typical right of the digital age. It has its origin in the judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 2014 in Google Spain, 26 the first case in which the Court was called upon to interpret a directive in the context of Internet search engines.
It is important to know the main lines of this case. The reference for a preliminary ruling was made in the context of a dispute opposing Google Spain and Google Inc (hereinafter referred to as "Google") to the Spanish Data Protection Agency (AEPD, hereinafter "the Agency") and to Mr. Costeja González. In 2010, Mr. González filed a complaint against the newspaper La Vanguardia and against Google based on the fact that whenever an internet user entered his name on Google's search engine, he would obtain links to two pages of La Vanguardia, which contained an announcement of a real-estate auction connected with attachment proceedings for the recovery of social security debts, on which Mr. González's name was mentioned.
It was the latter's understanding that the reference to the asset's attachment process, which had been completely resolved several years ago, was no longer relevant to the public, and that both La Vanguardia and Google should delete or amend those pages. The Agency rejected the complaint in so far as it concerned La Vanguardia, on the grounds that the publication of the information in question was justified on grounds of public interest 27 and was therefore legitimate. On the other hand, the complaint was upheld in so far as it concerned Google. The Agency considered that search engine operators were subject to data protection legislation and that the disclosure of personal data to third parties against the will of the person concerned was liable to breach that person's fundamental rights.
Google brought appeals against that decision before the Audiencia Nacional, which referred the questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.
In its judgment the Court drew from several provisions of Directive 95/46 28 (Articles 6, 12 and 14), 29 read in conjunction with Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, the right to have inadequate, irrelevant or excessive information about a person ceasing to appear in the results list when doing a search from the name -the so-called "delisting" -without requiring that the inclusion of information in the results list causes or may cause damages to the person in question.
The Court also pointed out that that right prevails in principle not only over the economic interest of the search engine operator but also over the public interest in finding that information, unless there are special reasons to the contrary, for example, in connection with the role played by that person in public life, which would justify a preponderant public interest in having access to the information in question. The recognition of the need to ensure "effective and complete protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy, with respect to the processing of personal data", 30 guided the decision of the Court of Justice. In the Schrems judgment of 2015, the Court made this formula even more robust by emphasizing the need to ensure "highest level of protection of those fundamental rights and freedoms".
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In the Google Spain judgment, the Court stated that "processing of personal data, […] 27 In fact, the publication had been made by order of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, with the aim of publicizing to the maximum what happened in the sales at public auction. 
carried out by the operator of a search engine is liable to affect significantly the fundamental rights to privacy and to the protection of personal data when the search by means of that engine is carried out on the basis of an individual's name, since that processing enables any internet user to

obtain through the list of results a structured overview of the information relating to that individual that can be found on the internet -information which potentially concerns a vast number of aspects of his private life and which, without the search engine, could not have been interconnected or could have been only with great difficulty".
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The effect of interference with individual rights "is heightened on account of the important role played by the internet and search engines in modern society, which render the information contained in such a list of results ubiquitous".
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In the meantime, the French Conseil d'État also submitted to the CJEU in 2017 two requests for a preliminary ruling, which are still pending when presenting this paper, 34 with a view to clarifying certain aspects of the "right to be forgotten", in particular, whether this right should be absolute and automatically operate when sensitive information is concerned and also what its territorial scope is. 
The fight against crime and terrorism, the discretion of the legislator and the balancing of interests and rights at stake; the judgments in Volker und Markus Schecke and Digital Rights Ireland
The obligation to ensure respect for privacy and personal data has already led the Court to declare all or part of important Union legislation to be invalid. That caselaw brings to the surface issues of a cross-cutting nature, in particular, the "eternal" question of any system of constitutional justice, namely the interrelationship between the discretion of the legislator and scrutiny by the courts, more precisely, the way in which a court of a constitutional nature must exercise its control while respecting the margin of discretion which is recognized to the legislator in any democracy in matters that imply sometimes very complex political, economic and social choices. In that context, the principle of proportionality, which forms part of the general principles of Union law and is enshrined in Article 52 (1) of the European Charter, has played a leading role in the Court's findings.
In 43 on the retention of data generated by electronic communications, invalid in its entirety on grounds of infringement of the European Charter.
Personal data is not, today, only valuable assets for private companies. It is also essential information for criminal police agencies and judicial authorities, especially in combating organized crime and terrorism. But in the 'Big Data' era, the track that each of us leaves in using electronic equipment or social networks and by staying connected to the Internet can easily slip into abusive interference in the private sphere of people.
In the Digital Rights case, the Court examined the obligation under Directive 2006/24 for electronic communications service providers to retain certain categories of data in order to allow possible access to them by national authorities competent for the prosecution of criminal offenses of special gravity.
The Directive did not impose an obligation to collect and retain the content of communications, but only so-called 'metadata', necessary to find and identify the source and destination of a communication, to determine its date, time and duration, the type of communication equipment or the location of mobile communication equipment.
These data include, in particular, the name and address of the registered subscriber or user, the home telephone number and the telephone number of the recipient, as well as an IP address for the Internet services.
Such data permits, inter alia, to identify the person with whom a subscriber or a registered user has communicated and through which medium and to determine how often the subscriber or the registered user communicates with certain people for a certain period.
Although the content of the communications and the information consulted is not concerned, the Court emphasized, that those metadata, "taken as a whole, may allow very precise conclusions to be drawn concerning the private lives of the persons whose data has been retained, such as the habits of everyday life, permanent or temporary places of residence, daily or other movements, the activities carried out, the social relationships of those persons and the social environments frequented by them". The Court acknowledged that the data generated by electronic communications is an important and useful tool in the fight against crime, in particular, organized crime and terrorism, whose effectiveness in protecting the rights to freedom and security set out in Article 6 of the Charter depends on the use of modern research techniques.
It concluded, however, that pursuing this general interest objective did not justify the particularly serious interference that Directive 2006/24 entailed in the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter.
The Court thus held that the retention of data, in the manner laid down in Directive 2006/24, was disproportionate in several respects. In particular:
-the data retention obligation covered virtually the entire European population, all electronic means of communication and all traffic data, even applying to persons for whom there was no evidence of serious crime; -no exception was made for communications subject to professional secrecy; -the Directive did not lay down objective criteria which would limit access and use by the competent national authorities to the data necessary to combat infringements sufficiently serious to justify the interference caused; -it was envisaged that the data would be kept for a period of between 6 and 24 months, without specifying that the precise determination of this period should be based on objective criteria, in order to ensure that it was limited to what was strictly necessary; -the Directive did not provide sufficient guarantees against the risks of abuse and access to and unlawful use of the data retained; -nor did it require the data to be stored in the territory of the Union, with the result that it could not be held that the control, required by Article 8(3) of the Charter, by an independent authority of compliance with the requirements of protection and security was fully ensured. 
47
The dispute opposed Maximilian Schrems, a young and active Austrian citizen, of Facebook, and the Data Protection Commissioner of Ireland. The case was predicated on the latter's refusal to investigate a complaint that Facebook Ireland transferred the personal information of its users to the United States and stored them on servers located in that country.
Max Schrems relied in particular on the revelations made by Edward Snowden on the activities of the United States Information Services, namely the National Security Agency (NSA).
For its part, the Data Protection Commissioner argued it was covered by the Commission Decision 2000/520, 48 in which the Commission considered that the United States provided an adequate level of protection.
The Court concluded that that decision, which was based on the existence of a Safe Harbour mechanism, itself based on the self-certification by US companies of compliance with certain principles, was invalid in that:
-the Commission did not ensure that the United States would effectively guarantee an adequate level of protection;
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-the Commission's decision deprives the national supervisory authorities of the powers conferred on them by Directive 95/46 to examine, with complete independence, any request relating to the protection of the rights and freedoms of a person with regard to the processing of his personal data.
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It remains to be said that the balancing of the interests involved in relation to the objectives and the relative gravity of the interference does not always lead to the same kind of conclusions.
Thus, in October 2018, in the case Ministerio Fiscal, concerning the interpretation of Directive 2002/58 on privacy and electronic communications, 51 in conjunction with Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, the CJEU validated the access by Spanish judicial police for a limited period of time to personal data held by electronic communications service providers with a view to identifying SIM card holders activated on a stolen mobile phone, such as their surname, forename and, where appropriate, their address.
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While admitting that such access constituted an interference with the fundamental rights of the right holders laid down in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, the Court held that, in those circumstances, interference was not such as to prevent access for the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offenses, in such a way that it would be limited to the fight against serious crime. 
